Balochistan, long plagued by insurgency and instability, is now witnessing a dangerous evolution with the growing nexus between the specially designated global terrorist groups Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch militant factions, particularly the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). The BLA, designated as Fitna al-Hindustan, has historically pursued an ethno-nationalist and secular agenda, while the TTP, designated as Fitana al-Khawarij, is driven by jihadist and religious extremism. Despite their differing ideologies, both groups increasingly converge on a shared objective: waging war against the Pakistani state.
The foundations of this cooperation were laid years ago, with TTP leaders first appealed to Baloch groups in 2014 to join their anti-state jihad. These initial overtures were unsuccessful due to ideological and operational differences. A decisive shift occurred in June 2018 when Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud became TTP chief. Under his leadership, the TTP redefined its objectives, expanding operations beyond the Pashtun belt and positioning itself as a defender of all oppressed Muslims, including the Baloch, providing the ideological basis for integration with disaffected communities.
By 2022–2023, these efforts began to bear fruit. Umar Media, the TTP’s official media arm, reported the mergers of four Baloch militant groups into the TTP: Aslam Baloch’s faction from Noshki in June 2022, Mazar Baloch’s faction from Makran in December 2022, and the Akram Baloch and Asim Baloch groups from Kalat and Quetta respectively in April 2023. These mergers marked the first formal integration of Baloch militants into TTP ranks. Following these consolidations, the TTP established a new wilayat, which basically refers to province or region under the group’s control, was set up in 2023 covering the Kalat and Makran divisions, signalling both organizational growth and ambitions beyond its traditional Pashtun strongholds. The group also maintains a strong operational presence in Zhob, which has become its main route of infiltration into Pakistan amid stricter conditions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with Sambaza along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border serving as a key entry point. Recent anti-infiltration operations in Sambaza killed 47 militants, including 33 in a single operation, reflecting the ongoing challenge posed by this corridor.
The collaboration between BLA and TTP appears to extend beyond ideology. The TTP provides financial support, arms, and training including expertise in improvised explosive devices, and has routed some advanced American weaponry left behind in Afghanistan to Baloch militants. In return, the BLA offers TTP logistical support and local intelligence in Balochistan, where TTP lacks an established presence. The BLA has increasingly adopted tactics characteristic of the TTP, including suicide bombings, abductions, and coordinated assaults, reflecting the influence of the TTP on its operational methods.
According to the Pakistan Security Report, BLA-orchestrated attacks resulted in 225 deaths in 2024. The report further noted that assaults by various banned Baloch insurgent groups mainly the BLA and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) rose by an alarming 119 percent, totalling 171 incidents across Balochistan. These assaults included highway blockades, a suicide bombing at a military camp, gas pipeline sabotage, damage to railway tracks, and the use of a female suicide bomber in Lasbela. These attacks demonstrate the increasing sophistication of Baloch militancy, which is likely influenced by TTP training and tactics. Propaganda coordination further reinforces the nexus, with TTP amplifying BLA attacks on social media and BLA doing the same for TTP operations.
Local dynamics and regional geopolitics have a significant impact on this relationship. The operational capacities of these groups have been reinforced by foreign actors and the Afghan Taliban. According to the authorities, there is also a strong nexus between India and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), with alleged support and coordination through their handlers in Afghanistan via satellite phones. At the local level, animosity has grown, especially among Baloch youth, as a result of political instability, poor governance, and severe governmental crackdowns. Long-standing grudges, like the murders of Hayat Baloch, Balaach Mola Bakhsh, and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, continue to feed radicalisation and keep the cycle of militancy going.
The formation of this alliance has already contributed to a notable rise in attacks on security personnel in Pakistan, including a spate of coordinated assaults in Balochistan’s Zhob and Kech districts earlier this year that left multiple officers dead and several injured. It is crucial for Pakistani decision-makers to remain vigilant regarding this evolving situation. A strong and proactive response is urgently needed to safeguard national security and prevent further deterioration of the situation.
